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FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET:  PRESUMING 
RELIANCE IN RULE 10B-5 PRIMARY SECURITIES 
MARKET FRAUD LITIGATION 
Matt Silverman*
 
 
This Note addresses the circuit split regarding the “fraud created the 
market” presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud cases.  
Fraud created the market was first adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit in Shores v. Sklar, and applies in cases where a defendant 
has engaged in a “scheme to defraud” the investing public in the primary 
securities market.   
This Note first discusses Congress’s intent behind relevant securities 
laws, the effect presuming reliance has on the class certification process, 
and how the presumption of reliance has been applied in Rule 10b-5 
actions by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Next, this Note analyzes the initial 
acceptance of the fraud created the market theory in Shores, and the split 
between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, which have accepted the theory, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Third and Seventh Circuits, which have rejected the theory.  Finally, 
this Note argues that the Fifth Circuit’s unique interpretation of what 
constitutes a “scheme to defraud” in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co. is 
consistent with congressional intent, urging its acceptance by the Supreme 
Court so that investors may have reliance presumed in the primary market.  
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INTRODUCTION 
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a 
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. . . . 
It is therefore proper that we consider . . . what may be described as 
policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law 
with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the 
administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.1
The question of how far securities law should extend to protect investors 
from fraud has divided courts for more than seventy years.  Currently, 
circuit courts are struggling with whether a presumption of reliance should 
extend to plaintiffs who seek to recover under section 10(b)
 
2 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19343 (Exchange Act) in Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 actions,4 when fraudulent 
misrepresentations or omissions were made during the process of offering 
the security to the public in the primary market.5
 
 1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
   
 2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk  (Exchange Act). See 
generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 37–39 
(4th ed. 2001) (providing overview of the Exchange Act). 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 5. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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In general, the securities market can be divided into the primary and 
secondary markets.6  The primary market consists of securities, such as 
stocks and bonds, which enter the market for the first time through initial 
offerings and distributions.7  Once distributed, the securities enter the 
secondary market, where they are traded between different parties on stock 
exchanges and over-the-counter markets.8  Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson9 held that reliance under “fraud on the 
market” theory (FOTM) could be presumed in actions concerning securities 
trading in efficient secondary markets,10 the Court has not recognized a 
presumption for efficient or inefficient primary markets.  The U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted some 
form of “fraud created the market” theory (FCTM),11 which extends the 
presumption of reliance to plaintiffs who were defrauded when purchasing 
newly issued securities.12  Shores v. Sklar13 was the first case to adopt 
FCTM.14  It extended the presumption to primary market investors who 
relied on the “integrity of the market” to filter out fraudulent securities 
because “governments would not authorize, underwriters would not finance 
and brokers would not offer to sell bonds they knew were unmarketable.”15
Circuit courts accepting FCTM consider a security to be unmarketable 
(or “not entitled to be marketed”)
 
16 when the defendants have engaged in a 
scheme to defraud the investing public17 and but for the fraud, the security 
could not have been sold on the market at any price.18
 
 6. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 1.1[4] (5th ed. 2009). 
  This scheme to 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 10. See infra Part I.A.6.a. 
 11. See Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. 
Fort Cobb, Okl. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983); Shores v. Sklar, 647 
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. May 1981). 
 12. See infra Part I.A.7.  Commentators have argued that the theory is baseless because 
it does not rest on economic theory. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Good Finance, Bad Economics:  An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 1059, 1060 n.5 (1990) (criticizing the Shores decision as unsupported by economic 
theory). 
 13. 647 F.2d at 469–70. 
 14. See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market:  An Unwise and Unwarranted 
Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 374 (1995) 
(commenting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Shores “set sail in new 
waters” by adopting this presumption of reliance). 
 15. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1159–60 (6th Cir. 1994); see infra 
Part I.A.7. 
 16. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469. 
 17. See infra Parts I.A.7, II.A. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.7; see also Client Alert, Chadbourne & Park LLP, “Fraud Created 
the Market” Securities Fraud Theory Rejected by the Third Circuit, Widening Circuit Split, 
2–3 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/656f9992-
3826-4c25-ace3-33ede8de9f6e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/346251ae-732d-448c-
83be-38c239759986/Security%20Lit-%20Fraud%20Created%20Market%20ca.pdf; Peter J. 
Dennin, Note, Which Came First, The Fraud or the Market:  Is the Fraud-Created-the-
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defraud must be “so pervasive that it goes to the very existence of the 
[securities] and the validity of their presence on the market.”19  If the 
security is found to be unmarketable then the investor must show reliance 
on the integrity of the market, and that the investor was injured by the 
fraud.20  Circuit courts have diverged on whether unmarketable means 
“economic unmarketability” or “legal unmarketability.”21
Economic unmarketability focuses on whether the securities could have 
been sold on the market at any price “if the true risk . . . had been 
known.”
   
22  The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this to mean that the security is 
unmarketable if the business the security is purported to support is a 
sham.23  The Eleventh Circuit also uses a form of economic 
unmarketability.  It applies FCTM when the security is patently worthless, 
defining this to mean that the security must have no underlying value (i.e. 
not backed by any assets or functioning business).24  Legal unmarketability 
determines unmarketability by looking to see “if, absent fraud, a regulatory 
agency or the issuing municipality would have been required by law to 
prevent or forbid the issuance of the security.”25  Circuits justify FCTM and 
these different theories of unmarketability with two main arguments.26  
First, FCTM allows courts to better combat fraud.  Second, FCTM is 
consistent with the purposes of securities regulation.27  Specifically, FCTM 
seeks to protect investors and promote open markets by punishing fraud and 
mandating disclosure in securities markets.28
Two circuit courts have rejected FCTM.
 
29  Most recently, in Malack v. 
BDO Seidman, LLP,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
summarized and expanded upon the many criticisms of FCTM.31
 
Market Valid Under Rule 10b-5?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2612 (2001) (stating that 
“‘[u]nmarketable’ securities are those issued only because of the issuer’s fraud”). 
  The 
 19. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 20. See infra Part II.A.1–II.A.3.  
 21. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2625 (discussing the different theories of fraud created 
the market (“FCTM”)). 
 22. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
 23. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 24. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 25. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s legally unmarketable standard); see infra Part 
II.A.3. 
 26. See infra Parts I.A.7, II.A, III.A. 
 27. See infra Parts I.A.7, II.A, III.A. 
 28. See infra Parts I.A.1–I.A.2, I.A.7, II.A, III.A (describing the purposes of different 
securities regulations as promoting disclosure, preventing fraud, and limiting unnecessary 
liability). 
 29. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Third Circuits have rejected FCTM. 
See infra Part II.B.1–II.B.2.  Meanwhile the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits have neither rejected nor accepted the theory. See generally Desai v. 
Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2009); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 
130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 1997); Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1151. 
 30. 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 31. Id. at 756 (concluding that FCTM was baseless, and that it does not have firm 
theoretical or judicial support); see infra Part II.B.2. 
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Malack court called FCTM a form of investor insurance32 inconsistent with 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),33 contrary 
to the Exchange Act’s purpose,34 and implicitly rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.35
Stoneridge did not explicitly mention FCTM; however, to be consistent 
with the PSLRA, the opinion asserted that any expansion of Rule 10b-5 
private actions, including the reliance element, should be left to Congress.
 
36  
The PSLRA was passed to decrease the number of strike suits37 filed 
against companies whose securities dropped in value, whether or not fraud 
was involved.38  Accordingly, the Malack opinion stated that FCTM 
undermines the PSLRA39 because the presumption of reliance causes 
defendants “to settle early and often to avoid litigation costs and the risk of 
getting hit with a large verdict at trial,”40 which makes frivolous lawsuits 
more burdensome.41
 
 32. Malack, 617 F.3d at 752.  Critics argue that investor insurance is created when 
reliance is presumed in inefficient primary markets because it makes investors believe they 
will be able to recover anytime they make a bad investment and, therefore, investors will not 
read the offering materials. See infra notes 218–21, 303 and accompanying text. 
  In interpreting Congress’s intent behind the PSLRA, 
the Stoneridge Court viewed the PSLRA as authorization by Congress to 
further narrow and limit the contours of Rule 10b-5’s private action and, at 
 33. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
 34.  See Malack, 617 F.3d at 752 (commenting that Congress purposely left certain 
injuries without remedy and that it did not intend to regulate the merits of “various 
investments”). 
 35. See Id. at 753–55 (stating that whether or not the action is extended should be left to 
Congress and “the § 10(b) private right should not be extended beyond its present 
boundaries” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 
165 (2008))); see also Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(finding that the U.S. Supreme Court “adopted a rather restrictive view of private suits under 
§ 10(b)”).   
 36. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165–66; see infra II.B.2. 
 37. Strike suits are frivolous lawsuits filed by lawyers looking to extract a settlement 
from defendants who want to avoid the costs of litigation. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (describing that the purpose of the PSLRA was to 
prevent these types of suits); see also Michael B. Dunn, Note, Pleading Scienter After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:  Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 CORNELL L. REV 193, 
196 n.11 (1998) (stating that the PSLRA was “designed to thwart the strike suit at every 
stage of litigation”); infra notes 83, 308 and accompanying text. 
 38. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2006) (limiting the awards of class plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees to a “reasonable percentage”); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, 37 (1995) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730, 736 (seeking to end “manipulation 
by class action lawyers” and “frivolous securities class actions”); see also Evan Hill, Note, 
The Rule 10b-5 Suit:  Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud 
Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2671–72 
(2010) (discussing the frequency with which strike suits were filed due to the low bar a 
plaintiff’s lawyer needed to overcome in order to extract settlements). 
 39. See infra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 40. Malack, 617 F.3d at 755; see infra Part I.A.4. 
 41. Malack, 617 F.3d at 755 (finding that these costs “infect the function of the entire 
securities market” by increasing the risks and costs of bringing securities onto the market). 
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least, to prevent any expansion.42  Malack points out that the “[a]doption of 
[FCTM] would extend § 10(b) liability far beyond its current contours.”43
This Note analyzes the development, application, and rejection of FCTM 
in the circuit courts.  It focuses on whether or not the presumption is 
supported by Congress’s intent in passing the securities laws and if it 
should be incorporated into Rule 10b-5 actions dealing with newly issued 
securities.  This Note contends that the Supreme Court should address 
FCTM and embrace the theory because it broadens the presumption of 
reliance without imposing burdensome liability on defendants who issue 
securities in good faith.
 
44  FCTM promotes disclosure by securities issuers, 
protects primary market investors, deters fraud, and punishes fraudsters, all 
of which are consistent with federal securities law.45  Embracing the FCTM 
exception would lead to a more honest primary market, and would not 
create the type of investor insurance and frivolous lawsuits that many critics 
foresee as a byproduct of FCTM’s adoption.46
Part I of this Note explains the adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act) and the Exchange Act, the judicial development of private 
causes of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, including the 
evolution of the presumption of reliance under Basic and Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States,
 
47
I.  THE PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE IN PRIVATE RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS 
 and the subsequent adoption of FCTM 
under Shores.  Part II addresses the circuit court split regarding FCTM, 
focusing on the variations adopted by the circuits and the reasons for its 
rejection by other circuits.  Finally, Part III advocates embracing a modified 
version of Shores to promote investor protections that are consistent with 
the PSLRA, the Exchange Act, and common sense. 
This part addresses the judicial development and importance of the 
presumption of reliance under Rule 10b-5 in the Supreme Court.  This part 
first lays out the Securities Act and Exchange Act and their purpose.  Next, 
it discusses in general why courts choose to adopt presumptions in court 
proceedings, and specifically how the presumption of reliance can affect the 
outcome of a Rule 10b-5 action during the class certification process.  This 
Note then surveys the application of this presumption of reliance to 
 
 42. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008) 
(“Congress . . . ratified the implied right of action after the [Supreme] Court moved away 
from a broad willingness to imply private rights of action.”); see Thomas O. Gorman, Third 
Circuit Rejects “Fraud-Created-the-Market” Theory, SEC ACTIONS, (Aug. 18, 2010, 2:47 
AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=2496 (discussing how FCTM is “contrary to the 
teachings of Stoneridge which cautioned against expansive readings of the reliance 
requirement, particularly in view of the fact that the cause of action under Section 10(b) has 
been crafted by the courts, not Congress”). 
 43. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754. 
 44. See infra Part III.A. 
 45. See infra Part III.A. 
 46. See infra Part III.A; see also Dennin, supra note 18, at 2614 (stating that FCTM is 
both “valid and necessary” and “provides investors with a flexible mechanism for combating 
securities fraud”). 
 47. 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). 
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fraudulent omissions of material information under Affiliated Ute and 
Basic, which expanded the presumption to efficient secondary markets 
under FOTM when there have been material misrepresentations and 
omissions.  Part I concludes by analyzing the Shores decision and the Fifth 
Circuit’s adoption of FCTM. 
A.  Private Causes of Action Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934  
Following the Great Depression of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities 
Act48 and the Exchange Act49 to protect investors from unfair market 
manipulation and rid the securities market of its former philosophy of 
caveat emptor.50  As President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated, the new 
regulatory scheme put “the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller 
. . . [and provided an] impetus to honest dealing” in the securities markets.51  
In other words, the purpose of the Acts was, and still is, to prevent fraud 
and create full disclosure in the markets so investors can make informed 
decisions on their own.52  To this end, the Securities Act regulates the 
initial public offering (IPO) of securities53 sold in the primary market.54  
The Exchange Act governs securities that have already been offered and 
sold to the public and are traded in secondary markets, such as stock 
exchanges.55  Both Acts require that companies disclose material 
information regarding the security.56
 
 48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006) (Securities Act). 
  Under the Securities Act, companies 
make these disclosures in their securities’ registration statement and 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 (1990) (describing the process leading 
to its enactment). 
 50. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1–5 (1934); see Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 171 (1994); see also Hill, supra note 38, at 2665–66 
(describing the circumstances leading to the stock market crash of 1929 and the purpose of 
the Acts). 
 51. H.R. REP. 73-85, at 2 (1933). 
 52. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (stating that securities law has “two 
basic components:  a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure when 
securities are issued and periodically thereafter”). 
 53. Securities are financial instruments that represent rights in something else, like a 
piece of a corporation or a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).  An initial public offering 
is when the securities are first offered for sale to the public. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.1. 
 54. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that the 
Securities Act “was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material 
information concerning public offerings”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 752 (1975) (finding that the Securities Act’s primary purpose was to increase 
disclosure in the context of “initial distributions of newly issued stock”).  Under the 
Securities Act, issuers are responsible for registering the securities with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and disclosing material information within the registration 
statement and prospectus. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 2.0.  A prospectus is any “document that 
describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling shareholder.” Gustafson 
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995). 
 55. See HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.1[4]. 
 56. Id. § 12.4. 
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offering materials (such as a prospectus),57 which are distributed to 
investors during an IPO.  The Exchange Act requires public companies to 
release information periodically in accordance with the regulatory 
framework.58  To monitor compliance with these regulations and enforce 
the rules promulgated under the Acts, Congress created the SEC in 1934.59  
The SEC plays an active role in regulating securities sold for the first time 
on the primary market and traded in the secondary market.60  Additionally, 
each Act provides private plaintiffs the right to bring actions against actors 
who fraudulently misrepresent or omit material information to investors.61  
This private liability is meant to allow investors to “safely buy and sell 
securities upon the exchanges” and to prevent fraudulent practices that 
hinder “the operation of the markets.”62
1.  The Securities Act 
 
The Securities Act allows private causes of action, in part, to prevent 
fraud in the primary market and to “promote ethical standards of honesty 
and fair dealing.”63  In furtherance of this goal the Securities Act covers a 
myriad of securities and establishes a low threshold for liability under the 
Act.64  Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act create private 
remedies for negligent conduct leading to misstatements or omissions in a 
registration statement or prospectus.65  This negligence standard has been 
interpreted to mean that liability is “virtually absolute, even for innocent 
misstatements” concerning the securities and parties covered by the Act.66
 
 57. Registration statements include disclosures made mandatory by the Securities Act 
and, absent an exemption, must be issued in order for a security to be legally sold. HAZEN, 
supra note 
 
6, § 2.2[1](a); see infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.  Registration 
prospectuses generally encapsulate information that would be useful to the average investor. 
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1168–69 (7th Cir. 1995); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b(a)(10)  (providing the statutory definition). 
 58. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 2.0. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 78d; see U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f. 
 61. See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.4. 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934). 
 63. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 690 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that Congress designed the Act to increase disclosure through requiring registration and 
punishing fraud (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976))). 
 64. Id. at 690–92. 
 65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2).  In order to have a private cause of action, section 11 
requires plaintiffs to show that they purchased a registered security and that “any part of the 
registration statement [or prospectus] contained an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein.” Id. § 77k(a).  Some courts have 
also interpreted section 17(a) as creating a private cause of action. See Thomas L. Hazen, A 
Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5:  Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641, 642–43 (1978) (discussing how section 17(a) is 
interpreted by courts as creating a private cause of action). 
 66. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983); see infra, notes 81–
82 and accompanying text (explaining that scienter, meaning knowledge or recklessness, is 
required under Rule 10b-5). 
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Although the Act is expansive, it does have limitations.  First, section 
3(a)(2) provides a list of securities that are exempt from the Act, including 
securities issued by state, local, and federal governments,67 such as 
municipal68 and industrial revenue bonds.69  Second, certain corporate 
officers are exempt from liability under the Securities Act.70  Therefore, 
investors who lose money due to misrepresentations in the primary 
industrial revenue and municipal bond markets have no recourse under the 
Act and must seek recovery through other channels like Rule 10b-5 of the 
Exchange Act.71
2.  The Exchange Act 
 
Section 10(b)72 is the “catchall provision” of the Exchange Act.73  It 
provides plaintiffs with a cause of action against defendants who use 
manipulative or deceptive practices in regulated securities disclosures.74  
Promulgated under section 10(b), SEC Rule 10b-575 is the primary means 
for recovery in a fraud action under the Exchange Act.76
 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a); HAZEN, supra note 
  Rule 10b-5 
identifies the following unlawful manipulative and deceptive practices: 
6, § 4.3. 
 68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2).  Municipal bonds are exempt because generally they are 
guaranteed by the government. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.3.[1][a] nn.4–5. 
 69. SEC Rule 131(b) explains this exemption, providing that an industrial revenue bond 
issued by a government, but payable by a private party, is exempt if the debt obligation 
relates to a public project. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.131(b) (2010). 
 70. Actions cannot be brought against certain corporate officers, lawyers, and 
accountants unless specifically mentioned within the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b); see 
also Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386 n.22 (describing how plaintiffs were barred from 
bringing an action under the Securities Act because the defendants were exempt). 
 71. Many of the key cases where plaintiffs have argued for FCTM involved 
misrepresentations made in the offering materials of municipal and industrial revenue bonds. 
See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1151–53 (6th Cir. 1994); Abell v. 
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120–22 (5th Cir. 1988); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 
463–65 (5th Cir. 1981).  At least one commentator has suggested that in Shores and similar 
decisions involving municipal bonds, plaintiffs “should be entitled to some minimal 
assurance that the market offers protection against sham investments,” but that “the best way 
of providing for this would be for legislative enactment of an explicit remedy for purchasers 
of revenue bonds comparable to section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.” Barbara Black, 
The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market:  A Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REV. 
923, 955 (1988). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 73. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (stating that 
“[s]ection 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be 
fraud”). 
 74. See id.; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).  In 1942, the SEC created Rule 10b-5 in accordance 
with section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.  Since Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 
512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the courts have created and upheld a private cause of action through a 
process of judicial interpretation and congressional inaction. See Herman & MacLean, 459 
U.S. at 380 n.10, for a summary of the evolution and then recognition of the private cause of 
action by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 730 (1975) (affirming that a private action had been consistently recognized). 
 76. See, e.g., Symposium, Happy Birthday 10b-5:  50 Years of Antifraud Regulation, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. S1 (1993). 
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(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
(b)    To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or  
(c)    To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security.77
The Supreme Court has recognized that 10b-5(b) extends to securities in 
the primary market context,
 
78 including securities that are exempt from the 
Securities and Exchange Acts.79  The private cause of action for 
misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5(b) tracks the common law tort of deceit 
and misrepresentation, also known as fraud.80  In order to recover, a 
plaintiff must show:  (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) scienter, (3) a 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance, (5) 
economic loss, and (6) loss causation.81  Since the 1970s, Supreme Court 
decisions82 and congressional legislation, including the PSLRA,83 have 
limited Rule 10b-5’s scope.  Even as 10b-5 has been actively restricted, the 
presumption of reliance standard has remained unchanged since Basic.84
 
 77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 
 78. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 383–84.  As Judge Frank Easterbrook 
observed in Eckstein, the plaintiffs get a longer statute of limitations under Rule 10b-5 than 
under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act, but the standard for liability is higher. 
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Black, supra 
note 71, at 946 (stating that courts that have adopted a Shores approach “transform a claim 
necessarily based on Rule 10b-5 into the equivalent of a section 11 claim”). 
 79. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.3[3], at 526; see supra notes 68–70 and accompanying 
text. 
 80. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 81. See id.  Each element must be pleaded with particularity in order to move past 
summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.3[3] (stating that rule 
9(b) necessarily applies to Rule 10b-5 claims).  Compare to sections 11 and 12(a)(2), which 
do not require a showing of reliance or scienter. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 
(stating that all that is needed for a prima facie case is a showing that there is a material 
misrepresentation or omission and that “[l]iability . . . is virtually absolute, even for innocent 
misstatements” whereas fraud requires scienter); see Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d 
1162, 1170 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that reliance need not be shown). 
 82. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 
(2008) (limiting liability to all third parties, regardless of their role in fraudulent conduct, 
because plaintiffs do not rely on third parties’ conduct); Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342 
(determining that plaintiffs must show loss causation); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (disallowing causes of action 
against people who aid and abet); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214–15 (1976) 
(replacing simple negligence with the element of scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975) (requiring a plaintiff to have either bought or sold the 
security affected by fraud). 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6), (b)(1)-(2) (2006)) (limiting class plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees 
to a “reasonable percentage” of recoveries and adopting higher pleading standards with 
regards to scienter); see also Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and 
the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (noting that because of the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations since Blue Chip and the PSLRA’s enactment, the “Rule 10b-5 cause 
of action actually provides markedly less protection than investors enjoyed before 1934, 
rather than more [protection]”). 
 84. See infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text.  Congress could have limited or 
eliminated the presumption, but the SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, testified in support of 
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3.  The Reliance Element of a Rule 10b-5 Claim 
Courts require reliance85 because it establishes the causal connection 
between a defendant’s fraud, the plaintiff’s decision to buy the security, and 
the injury.86  Thus, reliance proves actual causation.87  To prove reliance in 
a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s 
misrepresentation or omission was material88 and that the misrepresentation 
or omission was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s decision to buy, hold, 
or sell the security.89  The plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s 
misrepresentation or omission must also be reasonable.90  Even though 
reliance is a well-established element of a Rule 10b-5 action, over the years, 
courts have recognized that reliance is difficult to prove in class actions.91  
Unlike common law fraud, where an action usually involves a few actors 
dealing face-to-face, a Rule 10b-5 action “literally involv[es] millions of 
shares changing hands daily” between many investors and therefore “Rule 
10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass these differences.”92
 
fraud on the market (FOTM). See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Fin. of 
the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (“An actual reliance requirement 
of the type proposed would also make it virtually impossible for investors to assert their 
claims as part of a class action.”). 
  In order 
 85. Sometimes reliance is referred to as “cause in fact” or “transaction causation.” See, 
e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1118 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 86. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that the aim of 
“Rule 10b-5 is to deter misconduct . . . rather than to compensate their victims” and that 
therefore reliance ensures that the misrepresentation actually caused the harm).  The judicial 
requirement of reliance originated from the tort action of deceit. See Black, supra note 71, at 
923 n.2 (describing that elements of a Rule 10b-5 action are based in the common law tort 
action of deceit and retain many of its characteristics).  At common law, because the “great 
majority of [deceit] cases” involved misrepresentations between “distrustful adversaries” (or 
those at arm’s length), the courts used reliance to prevent the creation of insurance for 
injured parties. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 726 (5th ed. 1984).  
Thus reliance ensured that the fraud itself caused the injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 87. See Black, supra note 71, at 924 (stating that the reliance element establishes 
“causation in fact”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 cmt. b.  As one court 
put it, “[t]o say that a plaintiff relied [on fraud] is to say that the defendant’s actions ‘played 
a substantial part in the plaintiff’s investment decision.’” Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 
573 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1233 
(7th Cir. 1988)). 
 88. Determining the materiality of an omission or misrepresentation is a fact intensive 
question that requires the court to examine whether the omission or statement would have 
been considered by a reasonable investor deciding whether to buy or sell a security. Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32, 240 (1988); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating a fact is material if a reasonable investor would have 
considered the information important in making an investment choice). 
 89. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 90. List, 340 F.2d at 462. 
 91. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–45 (stating that showing actual reliance during class 
certification is impracticable); see also Dennin, supra note 18, at 2617–18 (explaining that 
showing actual reliance early in litigation would be “too burdensome”). 
 92. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–44; see Joseph De Simone, Note, Should Fraud on the 
Market Theory Extend to the Context of Newly Issued Securities?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 
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to encompass these differences, the court can presume reliance so that 
plaintiffs do not have to make the difficult showing of actual reliance for 
each of the many individual class members.93  This also allows judges in 
the early stages of litigation to focus on the underlying fraud, the intent of 
the actors, and the injury caused.94  However, the presumption is 
rebuttable,95 signifying that defendants can rebut the presumption at trial by 
showing that there was no actual reliance.96  Even so, the presumption is 
still useful to plaintiff classes because they have less to prove in the early 
stages of litigation, including the pivotal class certification stage.97
4.  Class Certification 
 
The importance of whether the presumption is applied cannot be 
understated.  Application of the presumption often affects whether a class of 
investors is certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Rule 23).98  In many Rule 10b-5 lawsuits, certification is outcome 
determinative.  Settlement is more likely when classes are certified, as 
defendants would rather pay a settlement than risk an adverse outcome after 
trial.99  Conversely, when the class is not certified, individual plaintiffs are 
often compelled to withdraw their claims because the litigation costs for an 
individual, or a class action with a small class, outweigh the probable 
benefits of prevailing in court.100
Plaintiffs will generally seek certification
 
101
 
S151, S161–68 (1992) (explaining the development of the rebuttable presumption of reliance 
in detail). 
 under Rule 23(b)(3), which 
requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members 
 93. See infra notes 115–24 and accompanying text. 
 94. See infra Part I.A.6.d. 
 95. See infra Part I.A.6.d. 
 96. See infra Part I.A.6.d. 
 97. See infra Part I.A.4. 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 99. See Patricia Groot, Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial:  Eisen through In 
Re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1157–58 (2009); see also Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 
F.3d 743, 755 (3d Cir. 2010) (agreeing that “class certification puts pressure on defendants 
to settle claims, even if they are frivolous” (citing In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 
552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008))); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that “class certification may 
be the backbreaking decision that places insurmountable pressure on a defendant to settle, 
even where the defendant has a good chance of succeeding on the merits”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 100. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral 
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 457 (2006). 
 101. In order for a class to be certified it must also meet the requirements of Rule 23(a), 
which states that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members only if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there 
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”102  If 
reliance is presumed, there is no need to show that each individual plaintiff 
relied on the misstatement in the same manner until after the class is 
certified.103  Without the presumption, each plaintiff would have to show 
how his or her individual reliance was sufficiently similar to every other 
plaintiff’s form of reliance in order to be in compliance with Rule 23.104  
This makes certification nearly impossible in light of the predominance 
requirement because of the expense of compiling the necessary information 
and the inevitable differences between class members that would likely 
exist.105  In this way, the presumption of reliance acts as a practical 
resolution to these difficulties, allowing for the common questions to 
predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3).106  
Without the presumption, defendants would rigorously challenge 
predominance during the certification process,107 which would allow courts 
to reject “nearly all proposed securities class actions under the reliance 
element.”108
 
 102. Id.; see Dunbar & Heller, supra note 
  Therefore, presuming reliance is essential for a class action 
suit to proceed.  In general, a court will only apply a presumption if certain 
criteria are met.  The next section discusses these criteria and how, in 
common law, courts decide if a presumption should be applied. 
100, at 461.  Rule 23(b)(3) is intended to 
redress monetary damages. See Groot, supra note 99, at 1147 n.28 (explaining that (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) were not intended to be used when the primary remedy sought is damages). 
 103. See Black, supra note 71, at 927–29 (finding that a presumption of reliance does not 
eliminate a plaintiff class proving reliance, but removes it from a court’s analysis during the 
class certification stage). 
 104. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988) (pointing out that in class action 
cases, to require “individualized” proof of reliance from each member in a proposed class 
might prevent an action from proceeding because “individual issues” would overwhelm “the 
common ones”). 
 105. See Groot, supra note 99, at 1152; see also Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 
1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Class-wide issues predominate if resolution of some of the legal 
or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy can be 
achieved through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more substantial than 
the issues subject only to individualized proof.”). 
 106. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (arguing that the presumption created “a practical 
resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in 
securities cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23”) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
 107. In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 621 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (stating 
the “strongest attack aims at the predominance requirement” regarding reliance). 
 108. Id.; see Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 747 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that “[p]roving reliance . . . can quickly become a cumbersome endeavor that overwhelms 
the ‘questions of law or fact common’ to the proposed class”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 394 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that “no 
class may be certified in a § 10(b) case without a classwide presumption of reliance”); see 
also Groot, supra note 99, at 1158 n.96 (describing how Congress could have limited class 
certification by reversing Basic when it enacted the PSLRA but did not because it would 
make bringing a class action near impossible).  
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5.  The Presumption of Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Actions 
Presumptions of certain claims or facts play an important role in judicial 
review.109  Courts and commentators have reasoned that allowing certain 
presumptions helps to realize goals of public policy, fairness, and judicial 
economy.110  Such goals are met where difficult-to-prove facts or claims 
are assumed, allowing an action to progress toward trial.111  Courts may 
also apply presumptions if they are consistent with “congressional policy” 
and “common sense.”112  Consistent with these goals, the Supreme Court 
has extended a presumption of reliance so that courts can focus attention on 
whether or not there was a material misrepresentation or omission, if it 
caused injury, and whether scienter was present.113
If a plaintiff can show that the other elements have been met,
 
114 then the 
Supreme Court allows a rebuttable presumption that plaintiffs relied on 
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions in two scenarios.115  First, in 
Affiliated Ute, the Court granted the presumption in cases involving the 
omission of information to investors, if the omitted information was shown 
to be material “in the sense that a reasonable investor might have 
considered [it] important in  . . . making [the investment] decision.”116  In 
this type of case, the net effect is that “materiality and reliance . . . collapse 
into one.”117  The presumption under Affiliated Ute has been widely 
accepted and the Supreme Court has rationalized the presumption by 
pointing to the inherent unfairness and difficulty a plaintiff would face in 
having to prove the counterfactual of “how he would have acted if [the] 
omitted material information had been disclosed.”118
 
 109. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (5th ed. 1999). 
Presumptions are also useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties. Id.; 
FED. R. EVID. 301. 
  However, in cases 
that involve a mix of both misrepresentations and omissions, the Affiliated 
 110. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; see BROUN, supra note 109, § 343 (noting that presumptions 
“correct an imbalance resulting from one party’s superior access to the proof”). 
 111. BROUN, supra note 109, § 343 (“Generally, however, the most important 
consideration . . . is probability.  Most presumptions have come into existence primarily 
because judges have believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of 
fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of fact A until the 
adversary disproves it.”); see Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (expanding the Court’s willingness to 
allow a presumption because it is difficult to prove reliance). 
 112. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46; see infra notes 293–99 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Black, supra note 71, at 934; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 114. HAZEN, supra note 6, § 12.10[6]. 
 115. See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 116. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972).  The 
Supreme Court found that positive proof of reliance was not the plaintiff’s burden. Id.   
Reliance is presumed if the defendant omitted information that it had a duty to disclose, and 
that information was material. Id.; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) 
(explaining that the duty exists where there is a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust 
between the parties). 
 117. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-
Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1005 
(2003). 
 118. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988); see Oldham, supra note 117, at 
1005. 
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Ute holding does not apply.119  In such mixed cases, the plaintiff must 
either show actual reliance or obtain the presumption through FOTM.120  
FOTM, as held by Basic, allows the presumption of reliance when material 
misrepresentations or omissions are disseminated into an efficient 
market.121  In expanding the presumption of reliance to FOTM, the Basic 
Court relied on the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH), an 
economic theory widely accepted at the time.122  ECMH states that in an 
efficient capital market, a misrepresentation or omission will be 
incorporated into the price of the security.123  Since investors use price to 
formulate their investment decisions, the Court was therefore willing to 
presume that plaintiffs had relied on the misrepresentation.124  Thus, in 
order to recover under the Basic standard, the plaintiffs were required to 
show that the market for the security they purchased was efficient.125
6.  Expanding the Presumption to Efficient Markets 
 
a.  Fraud on the Market Under Basic 
In Basic, shareholders of Basic Inc. claimed that the company and its 
directors issued misleading press releases which “artificially depressed” the 
share price.126  These press releases stated that the company was not 
engaged in merger negotiations;127 however, shortly after their release, the 
directors approved the sale of Basic Inc.128  The plaintiff class had sold 
their shares before the board’s endorsement of the sale and claimed to have 
been injured by selling at a depressed price.129  In seeking class 
certification,130 the plaintiffs argued the Court should apply FOTM to 
create a rebuttable presumption of reliance.131  A plurality of the Court 
agreed with the shareholders, and adopted FOTM, which expanded the 
presumption of reliance in Rule 10b-5 actions.132
 
 119. See Black, supra note 
  Writing for the Court, 
71, at 925.  In cases that involve both misrepresentations and 
omissions, the plaintiff would have to either show actual reliance, or use the fraud on the 
market theory of reliance. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (applying the fraud on the market theory of reliance “where 
materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed 
market for securities”); see infra notes 126–53. 
 122. See infra note 136; see also De Simone, supra note 92, at S156 (stating that “[t]he 
theoretical underpinning of [FOTM] is the [ECMH]”). 
 123. See infra notes 135–41 and accompanying text. 
 124. See infra notes 135–41 and accompanying text. 
 125. See infra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 126. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228–29. 
 127. Id. at 227–28. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 228. 
 130. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 131. Basic, 485 U.S. at 229–30 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to resolve a split 
in the Courts of Appeals regarding this presumption). 
 132. Id. at 246–50.  Prior to Basic, the Court had only recognized the presumption of 
reliance in Rule 10b-5 actions in pure omission cases like Affiliated Ute. See supra note 116 
and accompanying text. 
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Justice Harry A. Blackmun accepted the ECMH theory as a legitimate 
theoretical foundation for FOTM.133
b.  The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
 
The ECMH states that in an open134 and well-developed market,135 
where information is available and actors are rational, the price of a security 
will represent its inherent value.136  However, if misrepresentations are 
material, the price of the security will not match its value.137  In accordance 
with the ECMH, FOTM holds that since investors rely on the price of a 
security in deciding whether to buy or sell, it is presumable that the 
plaintiffs relied on the fraudulent misrepresentation or omission because the 
market digested that information (or lack thereof) into the price.138  Using 
this theory, the Basic plurality expanded the presumption of reliance to the 
limits recognized by the Court today.139
c.  Relying on Efficiency 
 
In accordance with the ECMH, the Basic plurality stated that a 
presumption of reliance can be applied so long as the security trades in an 
 
 133. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–50. But see id. at 254 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that the Court should not underpin a presumption of reliance 
solely on a theory “which may or may not prove accurate upon further consideration”).  The 
Court’s acceptance of the ECMH and application to FOTM has been widely covered and 
accepted by commentators. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, 
and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 910–12 (1989) (discussing 
the validity of the theory); L. Brett Lockwood, Comment, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory:  
A Contrarian View, 38 EMORY L.J. 1269, 1269–70 (1989); De Simone, supra note 92, at 
S155–57.   
 134. “An open market is one in which anyone, or at least a large number of persons, can 
buy or sell.” Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 135. “A developed market is one which has a relatively high level of activity and 
frequency, and for which trading information (e.g., price and volume) is widely available 
[and] will almost always be an open one.” Id. 
 136. See generally Basic, 485 U.S. at 244–47; Fischel, supra note 133, at 911–12.  At the 
time of FOTM’s adoption, ECMH was widely accepted. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Some 
Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) 
(announcing that “there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical 
evidence supporting it”).  However, over the years ECMH has been criticized by behavioral 
finance commentators that argue, in part, that even in efficient markets price may not reflect 
value. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Forum Article, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 137, 138–43 (2006) (stating that markets are “noisy” because market 
participants may act irrationally, choosing to buy, sell, or hold without the value of the 
security and its underlying assets in mind). 
 137. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 U.S. 148, 159 
(2008) (upholding the FOTM). 
 138. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244–47; De Simone, supra note 92, at S157.  Some courts 
find that the Court merely used the word reliance even though no such reliance occurred, 
only an effect on the price. See e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1129 (7th 
Cir. 1993). 
 139. See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (recognizing the ECMH and that FOTM and 
the Affiliated Ute presumption are the only times when reliance is presumed). 
2011] FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET 1803 
efficient market,140 because “[t]he causal connection between the 
defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no 
less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.”141  
The dissent criticized this position, arguing that people trading in the 
market, efficient or not, do not always rely on price to make their 
investment decisions, and regularly trade on the belief that stocks are over 
or under valued.142  The dissent found that this presumption was nothing 
more than investor insurance,143 and “effectively eviscerate[d]” the reliance 
requirement in contravention of congressional intent.144
 
 140. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244–47.  However, Basic “offers little guidance for 
determining whether a market is efficient,” Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 
368 (4th Cir. 2004), and has left each of “the circuits room to develop its own [FOTM] 
rules.” Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988).  One of the most 
popular methods of determining market efficiency was established in Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 
at 1285–87.  Courts apply a multifactor test, known as “Cammer factors” which include: 
  As is commonly 
argued by dissenting opinions regarding the expansion of the private right 
(1) whether the security has a large weekly trading volume; (2) whether a 
significant number of securities analysts followed and reported on the company’s 
stock during the applicable period; (3) whether the stock had numerous market 
makers; (4) whether the company was entitled to file an S-3 Registration Statement 
in connection with public offerings; and (5) whether the security experienced an 
historical showing of immediate price response to unexpected corporate events or 
financial releases.  
In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (citing In re DVI 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 208 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 
323 (5th Cir. 2005)).  Other courts have also considered additional factors:  “[(1)] the 
company’s market capitalization; [(2)] the bid-ask spread; [(3)] the float, or issue amount 
outstanding excluding insider-owned securities; and [(4)] the percentage of institutional 
ownership.” Id. at 632 (citing Unger, 401 F.3d at 323; Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 
F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2005); In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 
1315, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474, 478 (N.D. Tex. 
2001)). 
 141. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; see Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
259 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “[i]n an efficient market the misinformation 
directly affects the stock prices at which the investor trades and thus, through the inflated or 
deflated price, causes injury even in the absence of direct reliance” (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. Basic, 485 U.S. at 252, 256–57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(commenting that replacing traditional legal analysis “with economic theorization” was sure 
to lead to confusion).  But as courts and commentators have recognized, price “is the best 
indicia of value” which makes truthful pricing free of distortion all the more important. See 
Fischel, supra note 133, at 920.  Further, even in situations where investors do not believe 
price is reflective of the securities value, these same investors will still rely on comparisons 
“between [securities] current prices and expected future prices.” Id.  Therefore, just like any 
investor who believes that price is reflective of value, these investors rely on market to be 
free from fraud. Id. 
 143. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256–57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
FCTM has also raised the same criticism. See infra notes 221–23, 303 and accompanying 
text.  But see Fischel, supra note 133, who argues that even if there is effectively a non-
rebuttable presumption during class certification it does not create investor insurance 
because the presumption only reduces the burden of proof on one element.  Plaintiffs must 
still establish that the defective disclosure affected the security price and by how much. Id. at 
918–19. 
 144. Basic, 485 U.S. at 258 (arguing that the Exchange Act’s legislative history shows a 
clear intent to have reliance be part of the fraud action). 
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of action under Rule 10b-5, the dissent asserted that expansion should be 
left to Congress.145  Even so, the plurality found that FOTM, “by 
facilitating Rule 10b-5 litigation, supports the congressional policy 
embodied in the [Exchange] Act” to provide for a “free and open public 
market.”146
d.  Overcoming a Basic Presumption 
 
Importantly, even when the presumption of reliance is granted to a 
plaintiff class under Basic’s FOTM theory, a defendant can still defeat the 
action by positive proof of non-reliance.147  This can be done in several 
ways.  “Any showing that severs the link” between a misrepresentation and 
the decision to buy the security would be enough,148 such as 
“demonstrating that a plaintiff, even had he or she known the truthful 
information that was not disclosed, would nevertheless still have purchased 
the stock at the same price.”149  Circuit courts have expanded the ability to 
overcome the presumption by explaining that if a defendant can show that 
the investor “intentionally refused to investigate” a security, or if the fraud 
was obvious to the investor and that harm would likely follow, the 
presumption is overcome.150  However, rebutting the presumption is rare 
because that would only occur at trial, which generally does not take place 
because either the defendants settle, the plaintiffs are not certified, or the 
case is dismissed.151
Since the Basic decision, FOTM has been widely applied by the federal 
courts in Rule 10b-5 actions at both the district and circuit court levels.
 
152
 
 145. Basic, 485 U.S. at 256–57; but see Fischel, supra note 
  
But just as courts have willingly embraced the presumption in efficient 
133, at 921 (arguing that 
adopting FOTM “is judicial legislation only in the sense that all interpretation of Rule 10b-5 
is judicial legislation”). 
 146. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted).  Indeed, 
some have argued that FOTM is consistent with the Securities Acts’ goal of disclosure 
because it creates greater disincentives to commit fraud and incentives to voluntarily disclose 
information to “firms [who] are the lowest cost producers of information.” Fischel, supra 
note 133, at 921.  Indeed, in a developed market “investors generally rely on a security’s 
market price.” Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1994).  
Therefore investors indirectly rely on disclosure documents because financial professionals 
generally read the disclosure documents when making their decisions to buy and sell, which 
“affect[s] the security’s price.” Id. 
 147. See Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788–89 (9th Cir. 1980); Black, supra 
note 71, at 925. 
 148. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.  See Black, supra note 71, at 935, for examples of how an 
investor could be shown not to have relied on the market’s integrity.  One example would be 
an investor who sells a security solely to cash out to make a purchase, and does not rely on 
the market to make this decision (although Professor Black notes it would be difficult for a 
defendant to prove the motives of an individual seller). See Black, supra note 71, at 935. 
 149. Ballan v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 481 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Basic, 485 
U.S. at 248–49); see In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 150. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161. 
 151. See, e.g., Oldham supra note 117, at 1013 (stating “it is largely recognized that 
rebutting the presumption is, in practice, hardly ever done”); see also supra notes 99, 103. 
 152. See supra notes 131–41. 
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secondary markets, they have also been reluctant to apply the presumption 
in the IPO context, arguing that it is unjustified under Basic and securities 
law. 153
7.  Fraud in Inefficient Markets 
  
As much as Basic is the seminal case for FOTM, Shores is the seminal 
case for FCTM.154  In Shores, plaintiff Clarence E. Bishop, Jr. sought to 
represent a class of municipal bondholders who had lost millions after the 
bond issuer defaulted on its obligations.155  Bishop had not read the 
offering materials but sought to have reliance presumed.156  The court 
determined that the bonds were the product of a scheme to defraud investors 
perpetrated by J. C. Harrelson, President of Alabama Supply and 
Equipment Company (ASECo), Clarence Hamilton, President of Investors 
Associates of America, Inc., and Jerald H. Sklar, bond counsel.157  The men 
“determined to induce the Town of Frisco City to create an Industrial 
Development Board to finance ASECo’s [tax-exempt bond] facility as a 
scheme to defraud the investing public.”158  Under a local statute, these 
bonds could be issued for the development of an industrial plant, which, 
once up and running, would capitalize the interest on the bonds.159
In the application to the city and the offering circular, Sklar, as bond 
counsel, omitted information about SEC investigations and ongoing suits 
against ASECo and Investor Associates, and included financial information 
drastically overvaluing ASECo’s and Harrelson’s assets.
 
160  These 
misstatements and omissions ensured that ASECo would meet the statutory 
eligibility requirements to issue municipal bonds.161
 
 153. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 43  (2d Cir. 2006) 
(stating “[i]t is . . . doubtful whether the Basic presumption can be extended, beyond its 
original context, to tie-in trading, underwriter compensation, and analysts’ reports” (citing 
West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002))); Freeman v. Laventhol & 
Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating “a primary market for newly issued 
[securities] is not efficient or developed under any definition of these terms”) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted); Berwecky v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 197 F.R.D. 65, 68 
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that the “presumption can not logically apply when plaintiffs 
allege fraud in connection with an IPO, because in an IPO there is no well-developed 
market”).  But see generally Robert G. Newkirk, Note, Sufficient Efficiency:  Fraud on the 
Market in the Initial Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393 (1991) (arguing that 
applying FOTM to IPOs would further the disclosure goals of securities regulation and that 
reliance on the market price of an IPO in many situations is reasonable under the ECMH). 
 
 154. Although the Shores court and many subsequent cases did not refer to the theory as 
“fraud created the market,” the theory was given this name in Eckstein v. Balcor Film 
Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1130 (7th Cir. 1993), and has become widely accepted. 
 155. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 463–64, 467 (5th Cir. May 1981). 
 156. Id. at 464. 
 157. Id. at 465. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 466. 
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Additionally, the underwriter162 was aware that these documents were 
misrepresentative;163 the contractor of the plant entered a sweetheart deal 
with Harrelson, in which he paid Harrelson for the contract, and the trustee 
for the bonds failed to monitor whether or not ASECo defaulted, which it 
invariably did.164  When the default occurred, the value of the bonds 
decreased, and the investors, including Bishop, lost significant funds.165
Bishop alleged that he “was the victim of a pervasive scheme to defraud 
members of the investing public in violation of the securities laws.”
 
166  In a 
split decision, a narrow majority of the en banc court agreed, holding that a 
presumption of reliance could be made under sections (a) or (c)167 of Rule 
10b-5168 if the fraud was an “intentional scheme[] which deceive[s] or 
defraud[s] purchasers of securities.”169
(1) the defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto the 
market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending to defraud 
purchasers, (2) [he] reasonably relied on the Bonds’ availability on the 
market as an indication of their apparent genuineness, and (3) as a result 
of the scheme to defraud, he suffered a loss.
  The court remanded the case 
holding that Bishop would have to prove that 
170
The dissent pointed out that this was a new standard that departed from 
past precedent and widely held conceptions of actions under Rule 10b-5.
 
171  
Generally, cases involving a misrepresentation or omission in offering 
materials would fall under clause (b),172
 
 162. In general, an underwriter purchases securities from the issuer and then offers to sell 
or distribute the security on behalf of the issuer, thereby reducing the issuer’s risk if the 
securities do not sell. See HAZEN, supra note 
 whereas clauses (a) and (c) were 
reserved for instances where the defendant’s actions constituted 
6, § 4.27[1].  Underwriters are commonly used 
because “issuers do not have the wherewithal or expertise in the financial industry to market 
their shares to a large number of investors” and so issuers use underwriters who have well-
established distribution networks. Id. at § 2.1(1); see Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(11), 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006) (providing the full statutory definition). 
 163. Shores, 647 F.2d at 466. 
 164. Id. at 466–67. 
 165. Id. at 464. 
 166. Id. 
 167. These subsections make it unlawful “(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud” or “(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 168. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469. 
 169. Id. at 472.  Importantly, the dissent took issue with this statement, stating that “[n]o 
other court has applied clause [a] or [c] of the Rule on the basis of the scale or elaborateness 
of the scheme to defraud.” Id. at 486 (Randall, J. dissenting).  Rather, “clauses [a] or [c] of 
the Rule have been applied instead to cases in which the fraud is not covered by clause [b] of 
[Rule 10b-5]” like “total omissions cases, such as [Affiliated] Ute.” Id. 
 170. Shores, 647 F.2d at 469–70 (majority opinion). 
 171. Id. at 486 (Randall, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id.; see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1977) (stating that 
manipulative conduct actionable under (a) and (c) is activity that is designed to artificially 
affect the price of a security but does not involve misrepresentations). 
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manipulative acts,173 like stealing money, rather than when the defendants 
induced the plaintiff to do something, like buy a security.174
The basis for the majority’s new interpretation of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 
was that there is a “distinction between securities that are ‘entitled to be 
marketed’” 
 
175 and securities that are not entitled to be marketed.176  Under 
this distinction a security that is fraudulently brought to market but could 
still be sold, even if at a very low price, would be entitled to be marketed 
and would therefore not violate 10b-5(b), whereas a security that, absent the 
fraud, could not have been sold at any price would fall under the “not 
entitled to be marketed” category and thus the court would apply 10b-5 (a) 
or (c).177  If the security falls under the latter category, then reliance is 
presumed if the plaintiff “can show that he reasonably relied on the integrity 
of the marketplace to offer him securities that were entitled to be 
marketed.”178
Part I of this Note explained relevant securities law, what reliance is, 
when it is presumed, its importance in class actions, and how defendants 
can rebut the presumption.  Part II examines the diverging views of 
Shores’s holding in the circuit courts. 
  This theory of unmarketability is the foundation for the 
different variations of FCTM that exist across the circuits today. 
II.  SCHEMES TO DEFRAUD AND CREATING LIABILITY IN THE CIRCUIT 
COURTS 
The Shores version of FCTM enabled plaintiffs to gain the presumption 
of reliance when a newly issued security was so rife with fraud that no 
investor would have bought the security willingly had the fraud been 
disclosed.179  Shores’s novel approach expanded the presumption of 
reliance to schemes to defraud, under clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5.  
This decision departed from the widely accepted view that cases involving 
misrepresentations and omissions only fell under clause (b).180
 
 173. See, e.g., Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 938, 941 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(stating clauses (a) and (c) generally apply to manipulative acts that constitute a scheme to 
defraud not misrepresentations or omissions). 
  Today the 
circuit split consists of three circuits adopting and interpreting Shores’s 
elemental approach and expansion of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), two circuits 
rejecting FCTM, and three circuits undecided.  Each circuit court’s take on 
 174. Shores, 647 F.2d at 486 n.23 (citing R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES 
REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 1064 (4th ed. 1977)).  The dissent explained that (a) 
and (c) would apply if the defendant pocketed proceeds from sale, rather than inducing a 
plaintiff to invest more money through a misrepresentation, in which case clause (b) would 
apply. Id. 
 175. Id. at 472–73. 
 176. See id. at 486 (inferring from the majority opinion that if there is an “entitled to be 
marketed security,” then there must be a security that is not entitled to be marketed). 
 177. Id. at 473.  In other words, “but for the fraud the securities would have been 
unmarketable.” Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1130 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 178. Shores, 647 F.2d at 473. 
 179. See supra notes 163–75 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
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FCTM is discussed below in the following order:  first the circuits that have 
accepted FCTM, then the circuits that have rejected it, and finally the 
undecided circuits. 
A.  Redefining Unmarketability and FCTM After Shores 
The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each employs its own standard 
for what “not entitled to be marketed” means.181  The Fifth Circuit uses 
economic unmarketability and looks to whether or not the security is 
patently worthless.  In order for a security to be worthless, the defendants 
must have intended to defraud the investing public and the business 
underlying the security must be a sham.182  The Eleventh Circuit applies its 
own form of economic unmarketability.  It defined “patently worthless” as 
when a security could not be offered at any price, meaning that the security 
has no resale or liquidation value because it was not backed by underlying 
assets.183  Finally, the Tenth Circuit applies legal unmarketability.  This 
standard is met when the securities would not have been issued but for the 
defendants’ knowing violations of the securities law.184
1.  The Fifth Circuit 
  Although the 
circuits use different standards of unmarketability, all three follow Shores’s 
analysis of whether the plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market and 
analyze if this reliance caused injury. 
The Fifth Circuit refined FCTM and what “not entitled to be marketed” 
means in Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.185  Like Shores, Abell involved 
municipal bonds that resulted in the loss of millions of dollars to 
investors.186  The plaintiffs brought an action against the project’s 
developer and the underwriter’s counsel,187 claiming that their fraudulent 
activities had caused the bond issuer to default.188  During class 
certification, the plaintiff sought to have reliance presumed because 
prospective class members had not read the offering materials and therefore 
could not show actual reliance.189  Relying on Shores, the plaintiffs argued 
that but for the defendants’ fraud the securities would not have been entitled 
to be marketed.190  The defendants countered that in order for FCTM to 
apply under Shores, the securities would have to be worthless, and if they 
“retained any value at all” then the theory would not apply.191
 
 181. See supra note 
  The court 
170 and accompanying text. 
 182. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 183. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 184. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 185. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nom. 
Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989). 
 186. Id. at 1112.  As of the trial date the bondholders’ total losses were $12,019,118. Id. 
 187. Id. at 1114–15 (finding that section 12 of the Securities Act did not apply because 
neither could be characterized as a “seller” under the Act). 
 188. Id. at 1115–16. 
 189. Id. at 1119–20. 
 190. Id. at 1121. 
 191. Id. 
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disagreed with the defendants’ interpretation of what the Shores opinion 
meant by “worthless.”192  In Shores, bonds had retained some value 
because of the underlying assets.193  Even though the assets gave the Shores 
bonds some value, “the sham ‘business’ did not [provide value] because the 
promoters never intended to start a legitimate one.”194  In other words, the 
bonds may have had some inherent value because assets backed them but 
the hoax business was worthless because it could not generate the revenue 
to pay interest on the bonds.  Therefore, the court held that FCTM only 
applied “where the promoters knew that the subject enterprise was 
worthless when the securities were issued, and successfully issued the 
securities only because of defendants’ fraudulent scheme.”195  The court 
held that the plaintiffs could not rely on FCTM since the bonds “always had 
a legitimate value” because the underlying business was not a hoax or 
scam.196  The court therefore determined that the bonds were not patently 
worthless197 and although the defendants engaged in fraud leading to the 
eventual default,198 there was no scheme to defraud investors by starting a 
sham business.199  The Fifth Circuit warned that to hold otherwise would 
expand the presumption of reliance too far.200
2.  The Eleventh Circuit 
  Soon after Abell was decided 
the newly created Eleventh Circuit addressed FCTM. 
In Ross v. Bank South, N.A.,201 the Eleventh Circuit addressed FCTM for 
the first time.  Sitting en banc, a plurality upheld the Shores theory and 
extended the presumption of reliance to a group of bondholders, who had 
bought securities in the primary market and would not have been able to 
prove actual reliance.202  Extending Shores’s three-part test,203
 
 192. Id. at 1122. 
 the court 
recognized that the first element was a substantial hurdle because “the 
 193. Id. at 1121–22. 
 194. Id. at 1122. 
 195. Id. at 1122–23.  This has become known as economic unmarketability. See Ross v. 
Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736–37 n.10 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that under this standard 
marketability does not depend on the value of the bonds but rather on the value of the subject 
enterprise and the promoter’s knowledge of that value). 
 196. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122 (pointing out that the bonds always had a legitimate value in 
the bond market, remaining near market value for several years after Westside disclosed the 
accurate version of its beginning and several months after this lawsuit commenced); see also 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 391 
n.35 (5th Cir. 2007) (reaffirming the Abell’s not entitled to be marketed standard). 
 197. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122. 
 198. See id. at 1111–12. 
 199. See id. at 1122; see also Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469–70 (5th Cir. May 1981). 
 200. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122. 
 201. 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989); see Newkirk supra note 153, at 1405–06 (stating the 
“Fifth Circuit effectively required that a security be entirely worthless before the 
[presumption] would apply in the IPO context, a condition that very rarely holds true in real 
world situations”). 
 202. The class of investors had bought bonds without looking at the disclosures. Ross, 
885 F.2d at 728–29. 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 170.  
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defendant must have known the securities could not be marketed and must 
have brought the securities to market with the intent to defraud.”204  The 
plurality found that the plaintiffs failed to make such a showing, and were 
not able to show that the fraud was so pervasive as to make the bonds 
unmarketable.205  Unlike Shores where the “misrepresentations went to the 
concealment of existing factors vital to the viability of the project, [in this 
case] the alleged fraud center[ed] on projections of an uncertain future 
occurrence” and the court refused to apply the presumption.206
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat found that the fraud met 
the Shores standard, but rejected the theory because the Shores holding was 
“fundamentally flawed and should be overruled.”
 
207  Perhaps the most 
significant part of the concurrence, though, was Judge Tjoflat’s unease with 
Shores and the plurality’s attempt to define the “elusive” concept of 
“unmarketable.”208  Judge Tjoflat explained unmarketability could either be 
considered “economic unmarketability” or “factual unmarketability.”209  
Under economic unmarketability, which Judge Tjoflat stated the plurality 
had applied, the question a court must ask is, “[C]ould the [securities] have 
been brought onto the market at any combination of price and interest rate if 
the true risk of nonpayment had been known?”210  Judge Tjoflat, as other 
courts have pointed out, noted that this standard is near impossible to meet 
with bonds because even the most risky bonds can still be sold at some 
price.211  Furthermore, even if the issuer becomes bankrupt, a bondholder 
can still seek to recoup some value as a creditor, because “even bonds in 
default have a salvage value.”212  In discussing the unworkability of this 
standard, Judge Tjoflat also referred to Abell, in which he stated the Fifth 
Circuit had abandoned the economic unmarketability test in favor of a test 
that evaluated whether or not the “promoter knew that the subject enterprise 
was worthless when the securities were issued.”213  His opinion noted that 
this standard was equally unconvincing for two reasons.  First, it would be 
impossible for the entities involved in issuing the security to know if it was 
worthless.214
[a]ll of the parties involved in an issuance have a significant self-interest 
in marketing the securities at a price greater than their true value.  The 
  Second, it is unreasonable for an investor to rely on them 
because 
 
 204. See Ross, 885 F.2d at 729–30. 
 205. Id. at 731. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 733 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).  Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat also wrote that the 
Fifth Circuit had “embarked on a path of confusion, and I fear that the majority today only 
pushes us farther down that path.” Id. 
 208. Id. at 735. 
 209. Id. at 735–36. 
 210. Id. at 736. 
 211. Id. at 736; see Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 8 F.3d 1121, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993); see 
also infra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
 212. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 n.8; see also id. at 740 (writing that “to determine when a 
security is worthless is nearly, if not completely, impossible”). 
 213. Id. at 736 n.10 (emphasis omitted). 
 214. Id. at 740. 
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promoter/corporation and the issuer (if a separate entity) have an obvious 
interest in marketing the securities regardless of their true fair market 
value.  Likewise, the bond counsel and underwriter, who are often 
retained under a contingency fee contract, are interested in marketing the 
securities at an inflated price.  The underwriter in particular, who, like an 
insurer, can spread the risk of loss among many stock or bond 
subscriptions, has a reduced incentive to investigate thoroughly the true 
value of the securities it underwrites. 215
Turning to factual unmarketability, Judge Tjoflat found it to be the better 
choice of two unreasonable alternatives.  Under factual unmarketability, “a 
bond is unmarketable if, but for the fraudulent scheme, some ‘regulatory’ 
entity (whether official or unofficial) would not have allowed the bond to 
come onto the market at its actual price and interest rate.”
 
216  Even if it 
would be reasonable for an investor to rely on regulators, overall this 
reliance would not be reasonable because one would expect misdealing by 
the self-interested actors who bring the bond to market.217
With these deficiencies in mind, Judge Tjoflat concluded his concurrence 
by noting that the theory would be problematic in determining damages and 
would have adverse policy implications.  Because the investor relies on the 
integrity of the market rather than the price, there would be only two 
options for assessing damages.  The first option would be to award no 
damages because the investor had no price on which to rely.
 
218  This option 
clearly contradicts the purpose of allowing the presumption because 
damages “would be so nominal as to preclude the bringing of such 
suits.”219  The alternative would be to measure damages by the purchase 
price, which the opinion maintains would be unreasonable and against 
public policy.220  It is unreasonable because the investor “had no right to 
rely on the issuance price,” and would result in investor insurance, creating 
a situation in which “an investor might rationally seek to avoid reading 
disclosures in order to preserve a possible claim under Shores.”221  This 
disincentive runs counter to the Exchange Act’s purpose of creating 
disclosure.222  Even if one argues that such damages would cause a greater 
level of disclosure, the opinion points to criminal liability, already in place, 
to do the job of deterrence.223
In one of four dissenting opinions, Judge Thomas Alonzo Clark found 
that there were triable issues of fact as to whether or not the bonds were 
unmarketable.
 
224
 
 215. Id. But see Newkirk, supra note 
  Judge Clark found FCTM viable because Shores 
153, at 1407 (discussing that it may be reasonable 
for shareholders to rely on underwriters “and the IPO process to act as independent judges”).  
Further, in IPOs many of the “elements of an active market remain.” Id.  
 216. Ross, 885 F.2d at 736. 
 217. Id. at 740; see supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 218. Ross, 885 F.2d at 743. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 743–44. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 744 n.23. 
 224. Id. at 747 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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recognized a “legitimate theory for protecting investors from fraudulently 
marketed securities that supplements” the Exchange Act’s policy of 
disclosure.225  Judge Clark’s dissent interpreted the unmarketability theory 
under the protections of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) to mean that “[t]he relevant 
inquiry is whether there is any combination of price and interest rate at 
which the bonds would have been marketable but for the fraud.”226  Judge 
Clark imagined two situations in which this would occur.  First, where, like 
the defendants in Shores, “a fraudulent scheme’s sole purpose from its 
inception was to swindle investors.”227  In this type of case the inquiry 
would be easy.228  However, in a case where the “project’s promoters 
fraudulently portray an otherwise infeasible project as financially viable in 
order to issue unmarketable bonds,” the inquiry is difficult.229  The dissent 
recognized this to be a fact intensive question and therefore would require a 
“restrained approach towards granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendants.”230
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue since, the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently relied on the 
doctrine in In re HealthSouth Corp. Securities Litigation.
 
231  The court 
found that the presumption of reliance could be applied in the IPO of 
corporate bonds because the bonds “could not have been marketed at any 
price without the fraud.”232  As the dissent predicted in Ross, the 
determination of whether the bonds were unmarketable was a fact intensive 
question, requiring testimony of employees and economists.233  As one 
managing director of UBS testified, the bonds “would never have seen the 
light of day” had the fraud been disclosed.234  As the plaintiffs’ expert 
witness Timothy A. O’Neill235 pointed out, the underlying value of the 
company (negative $529 million) would ensure that no investor would 
purchase a bond for this company given its credit statistics.236  Or in 
Shores’s terms, “those bonds could not have been issued at any price . . . 
because you actually can’t settle into a known default.”237  Thus the bonds 
were not entitled to be marketed because they were unmarketable.238
 
 225. Id. at 748. 
  Since 
the plaintiffs also proved that they reasonably relied on the bonds’ 
 226. Id. at 750. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 751. 
 231. 261 F.R.D. 616 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
 232. Id. at 642. 
 233. Id. at 642–44. 
 234. Id. at 643–44 (“[Timothy A.] O’Neill found no basis in reality for the assumption 
that such a large new issuance of distressed company bonds with dramatically deep price 
discounts could have been issued to achieve an effective yield high enough to reflect the 
HealthSouth credit risk.”). 
 235. A former Senior Managing Director and former head of the Debt Syndicate 
Department at Bear Stearns Co. Id. at 630 n.13. 
 236. Id. at 644. 
 237. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. Id. 
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availability on the market as an indication of their genuineness, and that this 
reliance caused the plaintiffs to suffer a loss, which satisfied the last two 
elements of Shores and Ross,239 the court extended the presumption of 
reliance and the class was certified.240
3.  The Tenth Circuit 
  Today the Eleventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of FCTM, similar to the Fifth Circuit’s, looks at economic 
unmarketability.  However, the Tenth Circuit has taken an entirely different 
approach. 
Soon after Shores was decided, the Tenth Circuit accepted FCTM in T.J. 
Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Authority,241 
when it upheld the certification of a class of bond investors, including 
members who had not relied on the offering materials.242  The court 
affirmed that investors should be allowed “to assume that the securities 
were lawfully issued,”243 pointing out that FCTM did not create a scheme 
of investor insurance.  The court reasoned that the theory was a logical 
extension of Rule 10b-5’s protection against fraudulent schemes to “cases 
in which the securities were not qualified legally to be issued.”244  This 
adaptation of FCTM has come to be known as legal unmarketability.245
In subsequent cases involving IPO claims, the Tenth Circuit has 
continued to uphold this standard, relying closely on Shores and TJ Raney.  
In Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group,
 
246 the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado reiterated that FCTM arises only when 
dealing with primary market securities if “a plaintiff shows that but for the 
alleged fraud the security would never have been marketed and that the 
plaintiff relied on the integrity of the market to produce marketable 
securities.”247  The district court further explained the theory in Alter v. 
DBLKM Inc.,248 stating that reliance may be presumed if “the fraud is so 
egregious that no investor would have purchased the security if the truth 
were known.”249  The key to legal unmarketability was that without the 
defendants’ scheme to defraud, the securities would not have been lawfully 
issued and therefore were unmarketable.250
 
 239. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text. 
 
 240. In re HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 642–45. 
 241. 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984). 
 242. Id. at 1332–34. 
 243. Id. at 1333 (holding that the class “stated grounds for relief by alleging that the 
defendants knowingly conspired to bring unlawfully issued . . . bonds to market with the 
intent to defraud, that it reasonably relied on the availability of the bonds as indicating their 
lawful issuance, and that it suffered injury resulting from the purchase of the bonds”). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994); see Dennin, 
supra note 18, at 2629 (stating that legal unmarketability has not been accepted by any other 
circuit and is distinct from economic unmarketability). 
 246. 763 F. Supp. 1552 (D. Colo. 1991). 
 247. Id. at 1557. 
 248. 840 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1993). 
 249. Id. at 805. 
 250. Id. 
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The legal unmarketability standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit, similar 
to the versions of FCTM practiced in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, has 
rarely been applied.251
B.  Rejecting Shores and FCTM:  Policy and Congressional Intent 
  In fact, among the three circuits only a handful of 
plaintiff classes have received the presumption of reliance under FCTM, yet 
other circuits have rejected the theory, fearing it would be against public 
policy and the intent of the securities laws. 
Just as the circuits embracing FCTM echo the Shores opinion, the 
circuits rejecting the theory point to the Shores dissent and Judge Tjoflat’s 
concurrence in Ross.  The Third Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit have rejected FCTM in all of its manifestations, 
claiming that the theory lacks any theoretical underpinning, is contrary to  
Congress’s intent for the Securities and Exchange Acts and the PSLRA, and 
is not supported by the Supreme Court. 
1.  The Seventh Circuit 
In Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors,252 Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, 
writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit, addressed whether a plaintiff class 
could use FCTM in a primary market context.  Two sets of plaintiffs 
brought suit against the defendant, Balcor Film Investors (BFI), alleging 
that BFI fraudulently omitted facts from offering materials it had issued 
under the Securities Act to raise capital for a partnership.253  Using the 
supplement and the prospectus, BFI was able to raise $48 million, $13 
million over the $35 million needed to meet the partnership requirement to 
begin deploying the capital to make movies.254
The Eckstein plaintiffs had not read the prospectus or the supplement,
 
255 
and argued that FCTM entitled them to the presumption of reliance because 
without the misrepresentations and omissions in the offering materials, the 
$35 million would not have been raised.256  The court characterized this 
argument as asserting a claim based on causation instead of reliance.257  
The Seventh Circuit rejected the presumption, insisting that this theory 
would remove any legitimate showing of reliance—the necessary link 
between the injury and the fraudulent offering materials.258
 
 251. See supra Part II.A. 
  The court held 
that in order for the plaintiffs to recover they would have to prove that each 
of the thousands of investors that purchased the securities would have acted 
 252. 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 253. Id. at 1125. 
 254. Id. at 1123.  BFI had been formed by Balcor Entertainment Company, Ltd., to raise 
money to make low budget films, which would be produced and distributed by New World 
Entertainment, Ltd. Id. 
 255. Id.  The other group called the Majeski Group had read the prospectus and did not 
need to rely on FCTM. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 1129–31. 
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differently had the prospectus included the negative information and that 
the $35 million dollar threshold would not have been met.259  It appears that 
this counterfactual argument—that but for the fraud, the securities would 
not have been sold—is not practicable when dealing with the subjective 
intent of thousands of investors.260  However, it has been argued that the 
opinion’s reasoning is similar to the legal unmarketability standard,261 
because what the court was really asking was:  but for the fraud, would the 
securities have been legally issued?262  However, the plaintiffs could not 
prove that the investors would not have bought the securities but for the 
fraud.263  Whatever one might call this standard, it is clearly different from 
legal unmarketability under T.J. Raney because the court refused to 
recognize reliance on the regulatory process.264  The opinion stated that it 
was unreasonable for an investor to rely on the regulatory process by which 
the bonds were brought to market because the SEC does not engage in 
“merit regulation” when it reviews disclosure or registration statements.265  
Therefore a security does not reach the market because of the adequacy or 
truth of the disclosures.266
Next, the opinion criticized Shores’s theory of unmarketability, noting 
that “[s]ecurities of bankrupt corporations trade freely [and that] some 
markets specialize in penny stocks.”
 
267  Under this viewpoint, the lack of 
disclosure may allow the security to be sold at a higher price than its real 
value would dictate.  But even so, the Shores standard would almost never 
be applicable because securities almost always have some worth, even if 
only pennies.268  Yet, the court did not expressly address what would 
happen if it were found that the security was indeed worthless.269
Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed FCTM outside of 
Eckstein and its rehearing,
 
270
 
 259. Id. at 1131. 
 several district courts within the Seventh 
 260. Shon Morgan, Recent Case, Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 
1993), 107 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1175 (1994) (stating that this counterfactual requires 
subjective proof from the thousands of investors and that is “substantially less attractive to 
plaintiffs”). 
 261. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2642. 
 262. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131. 
 263. See id.; see also Morgan, supra note 260, at 1175.  The Eckstein case was reheard a 
year later by the Seventh Circuit, and again the court did not need to accept or reject the 
theory because the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof. Eckstein v. Balcor Film 
Invs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 264. See Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130–31. 
 265. Id.; see infra notes 295–99 and accompanying text. 
 266. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1130–31; see HAZEN, supra note 6, § 3.7[2] (stating that the 
“SEC does not review the merits of the registration statement and the offering,” instead it 
focuses “on the adequacy and clarity of the disclosure . . . and also will conduct a ‘plain 
English’ review of those portions of the registration statement that are subject to the SEC’s 
plain English disclosure requirements”). 
 267. Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1131. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2642; see infra notes 271–72 (discussing a district 
court’s interpretation of Eckstein to allow the presumption of reliance when the security is 
worthless). 
 270. Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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Circuit have interpreted Eckstein’s meaning.  In Levine v. Prudential Bache 
Properties, Inc.,271 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois understood the Eckstein opinion to leave the door open to finding a 
presumption of reliance in a market that was not open and developed.  
Levine stated that a plaintiff would need to plead that the “securities would 
have been actually excluded from the market” and not just that they would 
be sold for less if the fraudulent activity had been disclosed.272  In other 
words, that court adopted the economic unmarketability standard developed 
in Ross.273  Thus, only if the securities are worthless can a presumption of 
reliance be found in a market that is not open and well developed.274
The same year Levine was decided, the Northern District Court of Illinois 
further explained Eckstein’s holding in Endo v. Albertine.
 
275  The Endo 
court held that a presumption could also be applied in the primary market 
context if the market for the security in question was “sufficiently 
efficient.”276
was sufficiently efficient to presume plaintiffs’ reliance based on a fraud-
on-the-market theory . . . . [because there was] 1) . . . substantial volume 
of securities; 2) a large number of investors; 3) the direct involvement of 
many underwriters in the offering; and 4) the existence of an impersonal, 
national trading market where the price of the [security] is much more 
likely to reflect the public availability of information.
  Unlike in Eckstein, the market for the securities in Endo 
277
This holding does not rely on FCTM but rather a new application of FOTM 
to efficient primary markets.  The factors the court used are the same as 
those applied in the secondary market FOTM cases.
  
278
The Seventh Circuit has not addressed the Levine or Endo holdings, nor 
has it elaborated upon Eckstein. The Levine and Eckstein decisions suggest 
that if a security were either completely worthless or unissuable but for the 
fraud, then perhaps the circuit would allow the presumption of reliance in 
narrow circumstances.
 
279  However, these possible presumptions of reliance 
are different than FCTM for three reasons.  First, they lack the “scheme to 
defraud” element.  Second, there is no application of clauses (a) or (c) of 
Rule 10b-5 to cases that involve misrepresentations and omissions.  And 
third, there is no recognition that an investor can rely on the integrity of the 
market.280  The Endo court’s decision also did not accept FCTM.  Instead, 
Endo applied FOTM to primary markets.281
 
 271. 855 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
  There may be some narrow 
circumstances where the presumption of reliance can be applied in the IPO 
 272. Id. at 933. 
 273. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 274. Levine, 855 F. Supp. at 933. 
 275. 863 F. Supp. 708, 726–27 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 276. Id. (stating that in Eckstein the price of the security was determined solely by the 
issuer and the underwriter based on perceived demand). 
 277. Id. at 726. 
 278. See supra Part I.A.6.b. 
 279. See supra notes 259–74 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 167–70, 199, 227 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text. 
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context within the Seventh Circuit but these presumptions do not rely on 
FCTM.  Similar to the lower courts in the Seventh Circuit, district courts 
within the Third Circuit also displayed a willingness to expand the 
presumption into primary markets.282  However in Malack v. BDO 
Seidman, LLP the Third Circuit rejected any application to primary markets 
when dealing with misrepresentation and omission cases.283
2.  The Third Circuit 
 
In Malack, the Third Circuit became the most recent court to reject 
FCTM.284  The plaintiffs sought class certification after losing substantial 
investments from notes285 issued by American Business Financial Services, 
Inc. (American).286  The American notes were tied to American’s subprime 
mortgage business, and became worthless after the housing market 
collapse.287  American was forced to enter into bankruptcy and was 
subsequently liquidated.288  Malack and the co-plaintiffs alleged that BDO 
Seidman, LLP (BDO), an accounting firm that issued clean audit opinions 
for American, enabled the notes to be brought to market and meet the 
SEC’s registration requirements through fraud.289  Malack based his 
reliance claim on T.J Raney’s legal unmarketability standard, arguing that 
but for the fraud, BDO would not have legally been able to issue the 
securities290—without the fraud the securities would not have gained SEC 
approval and reached the market.291  The court rejected FCTM, and even 
stated that Malack did not meet the FCTM standard anyway.292
The Third Circuit was unwilling to accept FCTM for several reasons.  
First, the court denied that a presumption of reliance in the primary market 
context was justified, referring to the traditional reasons for using a 
presumption:  “common sense and probability.”
 
293  The court stated that 
common sense “calls for rejecting . . . that a security’s availability on the 
market [indicates] its genuineness and is worthy of an investor’s 
reliance.”294
 
 282. See, e.g., Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 776 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1991) 
(stating FCTM could apply “where the underlying business is an absolute sham”); see also 
Dennin, supra note 
  In order to think otherwise there would need to be “some 
entity involved in the process of taking the security to market that acts as a 
18, at 2635–36 (interpreting several district court holdings within the 
Third Circuit to support the Eleventh Circuit’s economic unmarketability form of FCTM). 
 283. 617 F.3d 743, 756 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 284. Id. at 745.  This was a departure from past district court cases within the Third 
Circuit, which had accepted FCTM. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
 285. A note, similar to a bond, is a debt security, which promises to pay a certain rate to 
the holder. See HAZEN, supra note 6, §1.6[14]. 
 286. See 617 F.3d at 744. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 745. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 748–49. 
 292. Id. at 756. 
 293. Id. at 749–52; see supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 294. Malack, 617 F.3d at 749. 
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bulwark against fraud” and that no such bulwark exists because the SEC 
“cannot be reasonably relied upon to prevent fraud because it does not 
conduct merit regulation.”295  The SEC only seeks to ensure that the 
disclosures are clear and detailed.296  Echoing Judge Tjoflat’s concurring 
opinion in Ross, the court also found it against common sense for an 
investor to rely on the self-interested parties responsible for bringing the 
bonds to market.297  Thus, filing a registration statement or other regulated 
disclosure “with the SEC does not lend any more credibility or veracity” to 
the security or its issuer.298  Therefore, it makes no sense to rely on the 
integrity of the market, or that the market is free from fraud.299
Next, the court rejected probability as a justification for extending the 
presumption because the likelihood of a security being legally issued is 
greater than being fraudulently issued.
 
300  Although the court could have 
ruled only on the unavailability of FCTM to Malack, Judge D. Brooks 
Smith, writing for a unanimous court, chose to reject the theory in its 
entirety.301
The opinion also made several more arguments against FCTM, stating 
that unlike FOTM, which is supported by economic theory, FCTM has no 
such quantitative or theoretical underpinning.
 
302  Allowing an investor to 
rely on the integrity of the market and assume that financial products are 
free from fraud would create investor insurance,303 undermine the 
Exchange Act’s philosophy of disclosure,304
 
 295. Id. at 749–50 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 
1155, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the “SEC does not read all of the publicly 
available information about an offering and then determine the legitimate price for the 
security.  Nor does [it] endorse any of the documents involved in the issuance of securities”); 
supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. 
 and render the Affiliated Ute 
 296. Malack, 617 F.3d at 750 (citing HAZEN, supra note 6, § 3.7[2]); see supra notes 265–
66, 295 and accompanying text. 
 297. Malack, 617 F.3d at 748–50. 
 298. Id. at 751 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Joseph, 223 F.3d at 1166). 
 299. Id. at 748–49.  The judge also rejected that issuers would act to ensure the reliability 
of their information in order to establish a reputation as an honest dealer because recent 
history shows that “[m]any entities . . . forgo the long term benefits of accurate disclosures 
for the prospect of short terms gain.” Id. at 750 n.7 (quoting Robert A. Prentice, The 
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 782 (2006)). 
 300. Malack, 617 F.3d at 748–52.  The court stated that “almost all marketed securities 
are, in fact, legally marketable.” Id. at 752. 
 301. Id. at 756 (“The [FCTM] lacks a basis in common sense, probability, or any of the 
other reasons commonly provided for the creation of a presumption.”). 
 302. Id. at 751 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1988)). 
 303. Id. at 751.  Quoting the dissent in Shores and Judge Tjoflat’s concurrence in Ross, 
the opinion stated that FCTM would allow recovery to investors who do not watch out for 
themselves, and the end result would be damages in the amount of the purchase price. Id. at 
753; see supra text accompanying notes 219–21. 
 304. The result of FCTM, the court posited, would be to discourage investors from 
reading disclosures and run “contrary to Congress’s goal of empowering investors with the 
information they need to make educated, prudent investment decisions.” Id. at 753; see supra 
text accompanying notes 221–23. 
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and Basic theories of reliance meaningless.305  Citing Shores, Malack 
argued that FCTM would “serve Congress’s goals of promoting honesty 
and fair dealings in the securities markets.”306  This argument did not sway 
the Third Circuit, which rejected the notion that section 10(b) could be 
expanded “whenever possible to prevent fraud” because securities laws are 
not a “catchall for any fraudulent activity committed in connection with a 
securities offering.”307  In support of this argument, the Third Circuit found 
that the expansion of reliance would be inconsistent with recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and the intent of Congress in passing the PSLRA.308
The Supreme Court pointed to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.
  
309 and the Court’s most recent reliance 
analysis in Stoneridge.310  In Stoneridge the Supreme Court noted that 
Congress could have expanded Rule 10b-5 actions when it passed the 
PSLRA but instead “instituted heightened pleading and loss causation 
requirements for ‘any private action’ arising from the Securities Exchange 
Act.”311  The Malack Court therefore interpreted Congress’s actions as 
seeking to limit section 10(b).312  In the Third Circuit’s view, even though 
Stoneridge did not specifically rule on FCTM, it foreclosed the issue.  Just 
after describing the two accepted presumptions of reliance set forth in 
Affiliated Ute and Basic, the Stoneridge Court stated that the section “10(b) 
private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries.”313  
Therefore, accepting FCTM would expand the cause of action under section 
10(b) and conflict with both Stoneridge and Congressional intent.314
The Third Circuit next contended that expansion of the presumption of 
reliance would increase the number of frivolous lawsuits before the courts, 
which it concluded was squarely against good policy.
 
315  Expanding 
reliance would make IPO’s less attractive to issuers because of the potential 
high costs of litigation and the prevalence of strike suits.316
 
 305. Malack, 617 F.3d at 751 n.9 (finding that the FCTM then “could be invoked in any 
instance where a security has made it to market,” which would make the Affiliated Ute and 
Basic presumptions redundant). 
  Finally, the 
 306. Id. at 753. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 753–55; see supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 309. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff is precluded from bringing an 
action in aiding and abetting under section 10(b)). 
 310. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 311. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754 (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165–66).  
 312. Id. 
 313. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165. 
 314. Malack, 617 F.3d at 752–54; see Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 
942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Stoneridge for the proposition that presumptions in Rule 10b-5 
suits should not be applied under new theories). 
 315. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754–55. 
 316. Id. at 755 (“[T]hese costs infect the function of the entire securities market, harming 
professionals (lawyers, accountants, etc.), the companies they serve, and investors.”); see 
supra notes 37–38, 83, 308 and accompanying text. 
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court noted that this presumption would lead to further settlements of 
frivolous class actions.317
The Malack opinion is the most resounding rejection of FCTM by a 
circuit court.  However, other circuits, like the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit have criticized the theory without specifically rejecting 
it.
 
318
3.  The Sixth Circuit 
 
In Ockerman v. May Zima & Co319 the defendants sold municipal bonds, 
which had been approved by the City of Bowling Green, Kentucky, for the 
purpose of constructing a retirement village.320  The revenue generated 
from this project would pay the bond interest, but not a single habitation 
was ever rented or sold.321  The defendant, Zima, was responsible for a 
financial study that was included in the offering materials detailing the 
potential profitability of the retirement community.322  Zima had reason to 
believe the project might fail for various reasons but did not include this 
information in the report.323  Meanwhile, the promoters of the project, 
Thomas Hunter and Bryson Hill, also had reason to believe the project 
would not succeed.324  In furtherance of their effort to gain municipality 
approval, Hill, who marketed himself as the “money man,” misrepresented 
his own financials and projections for the success of the retirement 
community.325  After the bond issuance, Hill filed for bankruptcy and the 
bonds were declared in default.326  The plaintiff, who had read the bond 
offering materials moved to certify a class, and urged the court to accept 
FCTM so that the other plaintiffs who had not relied on Zima’s fraud could 
be included.327
Ruling for the defendants, the court rejected the claim that FCTM was 
applicable in this case.  After reviewing the principles of economic 
unmarketability
 
328 and legal unmarketability,329 the court held that the 
plaintiffs could prove neither that the bonds were worthless330
 
 317. Malack, 617 F.3d at 754–55 (opining that “[r]ewarding frivolous actions with 
settlements is clearly undesirable”). 
 nor that “had 
 318. See infra Part II.B.3; see also Herzog, supra note 14, at 383 (“The Sixth Circuit 
declined to state affirmatively whether it would adopt or reject [FCTM]. . . .”). 
 319. 27 F.3d 1151 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 1153. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 1153–54. 
 325. Id. For instance the circular stated that the retirement community would be equipped 
with kitchens and a full time nurse, which the defendants were aware was impossible for 
various reasons. Id. at 1154. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 1154–55. 
 328. See supra notes 195, 208–17 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra text accompanying notes 217–23. 
 330. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1160 (stating that the retirement community “was developed 
and later sold, although at a substantial loss”). 
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full disclosure been made, the governmental entity would have been 
required by law to deny the bonds’ issuance.”331
The Sixth Circuit determined that the district court’s finding that Rule 
10b-5(a) and (c)
 
332 could “permit the court to presume that a purchaser 
relied on the integrity of [the] defendants’ scheme or course of business in 
issuing the securities” was erroneous.333  The Sixth Circuit did not address 
section (c),334 but did discuss section (a).  Since the plaintiff could not point 
to “any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud” other than the offering 
circular, the court held that subsection “(a) [did] not appear to contribute 
anything not contained in subsection (b).”335  The court emphasized that to 
apply section (a), as the district court and Shores had done, in a fraud case 
that only includes misrepresentations, would create a form of investor 
insurance, which would contravene the Exchange Act policy to promote full 
disclosure.336  The court reasoned that to interpret section (a) differently 
would run contrary to Basic and Congress’s intent, effectively eliminating 
the reliance requirement and creating “a new implied cause of action which 
amounts to investor’s insurance.”337  In concluding its discussion of the 
theory, the court chose to neither reject nor accept the theory because it was 
inapplicable.338
The circuit split surrounding FCTM has continued to develop since 
Shores first put forward the theory over thirty years ago.
 
339
 
 331. Id. 
  As it now 
stands, there are three circuits that have acknowledged versions of the 
theory, and two circuits that reject FCTM.  Interestingly, all sides of the 
split claim to advance a position they find best fits with public policy and 
congressional intent regarding the primary securities market.  Part III of this 
Note focuses on the validity of the varied reasons underlying the different 
courts’ positions.  Furthermore, it argues that the Fifth Circuit’s position in 
Abell best embodies Congress’s intent and furthers public policy. 
 332. See supra note text accompanying 77. 
 333. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161–62. 
 334. Presumably the court did not address section (c) because the defendants did not 
create the business to steal from public, as the defendants in Shores had. 
 335. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161. 
 336. Id. at 1161–62. 
 337. Id. at 1162; see Dennin, supra note 18, at 2639 (stating that the court was concerned 
that following the district court would result in removing reliance completely from Rule 10b-
5(a) and (c) actions). 
 338. Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1161 (“[W]e neither adopt nor reject that theory since to do so 
would be advisory.”). 
 339. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have also declined to adopt or reject the theory. See 
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that if the 
theory was viable it did not apply to the facts of the case); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 322 (8th Cir. 1997) (writing that “even if this [c]ourt were to accept the 
[FCTM], the plaintiffs do not allege [sufficient] facts”). 
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III.  FRAUD CREATED THE MARKET SHOULD BE ACCEPTED IN THE 
PRIMARY SECURITIES MARKET 
Several circuit courts have embraced FCTM because it allows investors 
to rely on U.S. markets to produce securities that are not intended to 
defraud the investing public.  The Tenth Circuit applies the legal 
unmarketability standard, while the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted some form of economic unmarketability.340  The Sixth Circuit and 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits are still 
undecided.341  The Seventh Circuit has refused to adopt FCTM, but in 
narrow situations it allows the presumption of reliance in the new issue 
context.342  Finally, the Third Circuit has completely rejected any 
presumption of reliance in the new issue context (except in pure omission 
cases).343
A.  The Correct Interpretation:  The Abell v. Potomac Version of FCTM 
Should Be Adopted 
  The Third Circuit’s firm rejection of FCTM has widened the 
split further, making this issue ripe for the Supreme Court to address.  The 
Supreme Court should adopt the economic unmarketability standard 
established in Abell, because it is supported by congressional intent, and 
reject both the Eleventh Circuit’s adaptation in Ross and the Tenth Circuit’s 
legal unmarketability standard. 
The Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s version of FCTM as 
articulated in Abell.  Abell’s holding proffers the best form of the theory 
because it expands the presumption of reliance consistent with 
congressional intent, public policy, common sense, and probability.  This 
version of FCTM allows courts to punish defendants who have engaged in 
schemes to defraud, while limiting plaintiff recovery to instances when the 
fraud is so egregious that no investor would have willingly purchased the 
security had all the information been available.344
In order for the court to apply the presumption under Abell’s theory of 
economic unmarketability, a proposed plaintiff class must show that the 
business underlying the security is a sham.
 
345  As illustrated by the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision, this presumption is difficult to obtain because the fraud 
must be knowingly perpetrated to an extensive degree.346  Many of the 
parties involved in issuing the securities in Abell made misrepresentations, 
broke state laws, and generally conspired to defraud the local government 
and potential investors.347
 
 340. See supra Part II.A.1–II.A.3. 
  However, the court would not extend the 
 341. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 342. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 343. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 344. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text; see also Dennin, supra note 18, at 
2644–45 (arguing that Abell is the best standard because it focuses on the issuer’s intent and 
whether the issuer intended to “perpetrate a complete sham”). 
 345. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
 347. See supra notes 186–99 and accompanying text. 
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presumption of reliance because the issuers planned to create a functioning 
business rather than a sham.348  By allowing investors to recover only in 
cases involving a hoax business, Abell’s version of FCTM punishes an 
egregious form of securities fraud while protecting issuers from meritless 
suits.349
These inherent limitations on FCTM’s application are also consistent 
with federal securities laws.  Both the Securities and Exchange Acts were 
passed in order to protect investors and increase disclosure so that the 
securities markets could be free of fraud.
 
350  Abell’s version of FCTM is 
consistent with these goals because it provides investors in the primary 
market—who otherwise would have no cause of action under the Securities 
or Exchange Act—a chance to recover when fraud has been committed.351  
Without an opportunity to have reliance presumed, albeit narrow, investors 
who purchased exempted securities on the primary market cannot bring an 
action without actual reliance, an almost insurmountable barrier to 
certification.352  Furthermore, FCTM’s presumption does not conflict with 
Congress’s intent concerning the reliance element.  Legislators who passed 
the Securities and Exchange Acts “did not have a pervasive intent to require 
plaintiffs under the securities laws to read or rely specifically on a 
prospectus or circular.”353  Additionally, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
was meant to be read flexibly in order to restrict deceptive practices in 
securities markets, just as it was read when the Court first recognized a 
presumption of reliance in Affiliated Ute and expanded the presumption to 
FOTM in Basic.354
Importantly, there does not appear to be any evidence that FCTM is 
inconsistent with the PSLRA.  The PSLRA was passed to insulate 
defendants from strike suits in order to keep frivolous litigation costs to a 
minimum.
 
355
 
 348. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
  To meet this goal, Congress increased the pleading standards 
 349. See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 50–52, 72–80, 146 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 91–93, 98–108 and accompanying text. 
 353. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 n.7 (5th Cir. May 1981) (stating that section 11 of 
the Securities Act “allows recovery for [omissions and misrepresentations] in [a] registration 
statement without proof of reliance”).  Since the Securities Act and Exchange Acts were 
passed with the same goals in mind, section 11 indicates that the reliance element is not set 
in stone. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995) (stating that “[i]t is 
understandable that Congress would provide buyers with a right to rescind, without proof of 
fraud or reliance, as to misstatements . . . in the context of a public offering by an issuer or 
its controlling shareholders”); Shores, 647 F.2d at 470 n.7.  Interestingly, at least one 
commentator has suggested that Congress could expand the remedies of section 11 so that it 
would encompass securities or participants exempted by the Securities Act, thereby 
eliminating the need for FCTM. See Black, supra note 71, at 955. 
 354. See supra notes 73, 113–21 and accompanying text; see also Santa Fe Indus. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1977) (stating that section “10(b) must be read flexibly, not 
technically and restrictively” so that plaintiffs who suffer injury as a result of securities fraud 
can recover) (citation omitted).   
 355. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
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for scienter.356  Congress could have reversed the Affiliated Ute or Basic 
presumptions of reliance but it did not.  In fact, an earlier version of the Act 
included a provision seeking elimination of Basic’s presumption but it was 
rejected.357  This suggests that Congress supports presumptions of reliance 
because they are necessary to Rule 10b-5.  Further, FCTM is consistent 
with the PSLRA’s intention to prevent unnecessary litigation costs because 
attorneys would only bring an action under FCTM in very limited 
circumstances, where the security is exempt from the Securities Act and the 
fraud is so extensive it meets Abell’s standard.358
One could argue that there is no need for FCTM because issuers “benefit 
when [they] develop[] a reputation for disclosing accurate information to 
investors.”
 
359  Yet it has become clear in recent history that firms do not act 
as honestly as once thought, and increasing liability may be necessary in 
order to protect markets from fraud.360
This version of FCTM should be accepted because it meets both common 
sense and probability.  FCTM is supported by common sense because it is 
reasonable for an investor to expect that, regardless of its profitability, 
newly issued securities’ offering documents are not one long laundry list of 
misrepresentations written with the intent of stealing from the public.  The 
Malack court contended that reliance on the integrity of the market did not 
meet the common sense requirement because there is no regulatory agency 
or actor that operates as a bulwark against fraud.
  Indeed, the FCTM presumption is 
consistent with the view that securities markets should be free from heavy 
regulation because it would rarely be applicable. 
361  Although the Malack 
decision is correct that no such agency exists and that actors bringing a 
security onto the market are self-interested, the Third Circuit too quickly 
dismissed the honesty of the financial industry as well as the immensity and 
type of fraud required by Abell.  An investor may reasonably expect that a 
limited degree of misrepresentation will occur during the IPO process.  
However, it is unreasonable to expect that financial professionals will either 
negligently or knowingly overlook an entirely bogus enterprise.362
 
 356. See supra text accompanying note 
  
Therefore, common sense is a question of degree and it is reasonable for 
investors to expect that sham businesses will not be capitalized and sold on 
the market. 
311. 
 357. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 358. This is because a plaintiff would bring an action under the Securities Act if possible 
because the standard is negligence, a far lower burden of proof than Rule 10b-5’s scienter 
requirement. See supra notes 65–66, 81 and accompanying text. 
 359. See Prentice, supra note 299, at 781; see Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 
743, 750 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (mentioning that the long term benefits of honest disclosure 
prevents fraud). 
 360. Malack, 617 F.3d at 750 n.7 (stating that many issuers after short term gain forego 
the long term benefits of honest disclosure); see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused 
Enron?  A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 
269–72 (2004). 
 361. See supra notes 265–68, 295–96 and accompanying text. 
 362. Most securities are issued without fraud. See Malack, 617 F.3d at 748–49, 752. 
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Additionally, FCTM is justified by probability.  The likelihood of fraud 
being uncovered under Rule 10b-5 claims through use of FCTM is high, 
even if the security turns out to be marketable.  In most of the decisions 
analyzed in Part II, there was some type of fraudulent misrepresentation.363  
This high rate of fraud was, in part, a product of the high burden imposed 
by FCTM.  Without a convincing argument that fraud occurred, it would be 
foolish to bother litigating a claim on FCTM.  The Malack opinion rejected 
the argument that probability justifies FCTM, contending that there is a 
higher probability that a security will be issued legally than not.364  This 
argument misses the point.  The pertinent question is what percentage of 
FCTM claims are actually a product of fraud.  Abell’s high burden of proof 
alleviates this concern because it ensures a high probability that fraud was 
committed.365
Although imposing FCTM could lead to a higher number of successful 
class certifications, it will not create investor insurance.  The combination 
of the PSLRA’s higher pleading standards and the unmarketability element 
established in Abell make pleading a prima facie case of FCTM highly 
burdensome.
 
366  Even if the number of classes receiving certification were 
to increase, FCTM is justified as a means to preserve the intent of securities 
laws.  Though some innocent defendants may choose to settle or may incur 
extraneous legal costs, on the whole, the law will promote disclosure and 
investor protection, and only Abell’s iteration of FCTM can meet these 
ends.367
B.  The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ Interpretation of FCTM Should Be 
Rejected 
 
The forms of FCTM that have been accepted by the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits should not be adopted.  The Tenth Circuit’s legal unmarketability 
standard should be rejected because it is unreasonable for investors to rely 
solely on the SEC, which does not engage in merit regulation, to prevent 
fraudulent misrepresentations in IPOs.368  When a security is issued, the 
SEC reviews the offering documents to ensure that the disclosures meet 
various regulations.369
 
 363. See supra Part II. 
  However, it does not investigate whether these 
 364. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra text accompanying note 363.  The Securities Act contributes to this 
likelihood because any case that is not exempt will likely result in an action under section 
11, which has the lower negligence hurdle as compared to scienter under Rule 10b-5. See 
supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 366. Further, investor insurance is an exaggerated critique of FCTM because the 
presumption is rebuttable.  The defendants only have to show at trial that the plaintiff class 
did not actually rely on the fraud in the offering materials.  In cases where the defendants are 
innocent, they will always have a chance to prevail. 
 367. See Dennin, supra note 18, at 2642–47 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit’s 
application of FCTM should be accepted because it is in accord with the Exchange Act’s 
purpose and does not create investor insurance). 
 368. See supra notes 265–66, 295–96 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra notes 265–66, 295–96 and accompanying text. 
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disclosures are true.370  Therefore, it does not meet the common sense 
requirement for an investor to rely on the SEC to prevent 
misrepresentations and omissions in the offering documents.371  In addition, 
legal unmarketability is too expansive and would result in investor 
insurance.372  Unlike Abell, the T.J. Raney standard of unmarketability 
would encourage investors to bring a strike suit anytime a misrepresentation 
was made knowingly.  Thus, this standard is contrary to the PSLRA’s intent 
and should not be adopted.  Similarly, the Court should reject the Ross 
standard of economic unmarketability because it inappropriately relies on 
the value of the security.373  Since the purpose of FCTM is to prevent fraud 
and protect investors, it makes more sense to analyze the fraud rather than 
the security’s value.  Further, Ross’s standard of unmarketability is too 
narrow, because even the most worthless securities have some resale 
value.374  Therefore, in a situation like Shores where every actor involved 
in the IPO knowingly engaged in illegal activity, FCTM would not apply 
because the Shores bonds had scant underlying assets.375
CONCLUSION 
  The Ross 
standard may prevent unnecessary litigation successfully, as mandated by 
the PSLRA, but it is under inclusive to the point of protecting the 
perpetrators of fraud rather than its victims. 
The application of FCTM has been a controversial method of presuming 
reliance in Rule 10b-5 actions since Shores first announced it over thirty 
years ago.  In that time, the Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted various approaches, including legal unmarketability and two 
distinct versions of economic unmarketability.  Most recently, the Third 
Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in rejecting the theory.  Of these 
interpretations, the Fifth Circuit’s position in Abell is the most compelling.  
Its application of FCTM provides investors with a much-needed avenue of 
redress without needlessly expanding the presumption of reliance.  With 
this in mind, the Supreme Court should adopt the Abell standard and give 
investors protection against flagrant forms of fraud. 
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of the registration statement and the offering” rather it looks for “sufficient detail and with 
sufficient clarity” in the materials). 
 372. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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